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This paper first documents the comparative productivity performance of the United
States and Britain since 1870, showing the importance of developments in services.
We identify the transition in market services from customised, low-volume, high-
margin business organised on a network basis to standardised, high-volume, low-
margin business with hierarchical management, as a key factor. A model of the
interaction between technology, organisation and economic performance is then
provided, focusing on the transition from networks to hierarchies. Three general
lessons are drawn: (1) developments in services must be analysed if the major
changes in comparative productivity performance among nations are to be understood
fully (2) different technologies and organisational forms can co-exist efficiently (3)
technological change can cause difficulties of adjustment in technology-using sectors
if it is not suited to the social capabilities of the society.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
This paper uses the experience of Britain and the United States to draw some lessons
concerning the role of services in overall productivity performance and the difficulties
of raising productivity in technology-using sectors. The United States overtook
Britain in comparative productivity levels for the whole economy primarily as a result
of trends in services rather than trends in industry. US overtaking of Britain in market
services occurred during the transition from customised, low-volume, high-margin
business organised on a network basis to standardised, high-volume, low-margin
business with hierarchical management from the 1870s. This development was
dependent on technologies that improved communications and information
processing. Although the transition to high-volume, low-margin business occurred
across a wide range of services, some activities remained better suited to low-volume,
high-margin business. Since Britain was more successful in these low-volume, high-
margin sectors, British relative economic decline was modest. Nevertheless, the
overall transformation was dependent on the existence of appropriate social
capabilities, including a high level of education and a willingness to accept an
intensification of the labour process. The technologies were slower to diffuse in
Britain as a result of lower levels of education and stronger labour force resistance to
intensification.
After documenting the historical productivity trends in section II, we model
the transition from networks to hierarchies in section III. We show that networks are
more suitable for customised ventures while hierarchies are more suitable for
standardised ventures, that technological change which increases scale or decreases
monitoring costs favours hierarchies over networks, and that such technological
3change may create difficulties of adjustment for a society with a history of success
based upon networks. Section IV combines the historical and theoretical analysis to
draw three lessons: (1) we need to analyse developments in services if we are to
understand fully the major changes in comparative productivity performance among
nations (2) different technologies and organisational forms can co-exist efficiently (3)
technological change can cause difficulties of adjustment in technology-using sectors
if it is not suited to the social capabilities of the society.
II. HISTORICAL TRENDS
1. Comparative productivity in services and the aggregate economy
We begin by setting out in Table 1 comparative productivity trends in the aggregate
economy and assessing the importance of services for these trends. In 1870, aggregate
labour productivity in the United States was lower than in Britain, with US overtaking
occurring in the 1890s. The US labour productivity lead peaked in the 1950s, after
which Britain narrowed the gap slowly. The importance of services to Britain’s
changing comparative productivity position can be demonstrated with the sectoral
breakdown in Table 1. Note first that the long-run trends in comparative labour
productivity levels for the aggregate economy owe rather less to trends in industry
than is usually assumed in accounts of comparative productivity performance. Thus,
for example, between circa 1890 and 1990, the US labour productivity lead in
industry declined slightly while the United States went from a position of lower
aggregate labour productivity to a 33 per cent lead. Note, second, that comparative
productivity trends in services broadly mirror comparative productivity trends for the
economy as a whole. That is not to say that industry and agriculture did not matter,
particularly in shorter-run fluctuations of comparative productivity. Indeed,
4Broadberry (1997a) notes that the US productivity lead in manufacturing increased
across World War I and again across World War II, but in both cases the increase was
not sustained. Also, Broadberry (1998) notes that the shift out of agriculture, a low
value-added activity, occurred later in the United States, contributing to the US
catching up. But again, even in shorter-run fluctuations, services dominate; the
correlation coefficient R between the comparative productivity in the aggregate
economy and in services in Table 1 is 0.98, compared with 0.85 between the
aggregate economy and industry and 0.65 between the aggregate economy and
agriculture.
2. Comparative productivity patterns within services
Trends in comparative productivity in services as a whole are driven by trends in
comparative productivity in market services, where output can be measured
independently of inputs. In Table 2, we nevertheless see that comparative productivity
performance within market services has not been uniform. The United States had
already built up a substantial lead in transport and communications before World War
I, and this lead remained substantial during the interwar period. Despite a reduction in
this lead since World War II, Britain remained a long way behind in transport and
communications in 1990. In distribution, although the United States had overtaken
Britain by World War I, the lead remained relatively small between the wars. Only
since World War II has the US lead in distribution been decisive. In finance,
professional and personal services, although the United States pulled ahead across
World War I, the British lead was restored during the financial crisis of the 1930s, and
the US productivity lead in this sector has remained relatively small since World War
II.
5There are some more disaggregated estimates of comparative productivity for
a number of benchmark years in Table 3, which add some more detail to the picture.
First, the comparative productivity trend in transport and communications is mirrored
in the trend on the railways, but with an even more dramatic US lead emerging. A
substantial productivity gap had also opened up in communications before World War
I and in road transport, shipping and air transport after World War II. In financial
services more narrowly defined, the United States had pulled slightly ahead of Britain
before World War I and built up a bigger lead during the 1920s. The US banking
crisis of the 1930s shows up more clearly in these estimates, and the US lead since
World War II is more decisive.
3. Modern business enterprise and productivity performance in market services
The emergence of the US productivity lead in services is associated with the
appearance of modern business enterprise, characterised by standardised, high-
volume, low-margin business and multiple operating units managed by a hierarchy of
salaried executives. This hierarchical form of business organisation competed with the
previously dominant network form of organisation, based on customised, low-volume,
high-margin business. The transformation began in transport and communications,
spreading later to distribution and finance. As noted by Chandler (1977: 81-121), the
modern hierarchical corporation began on the US railroads during the late nineteenth
century. Unlike turnpikes or canals, railways required centralised operation since
steam locomotives moved much faster than horse-drawn carriages or barges and
operated on a single track. As the length of the track that a railroad operated extended
beyond what could be managed personally by a single superintendent, the railroad
6was divided into geographic divisions, and each division was further subdivided by
function and managerial hierarchies appeared (Chandler, 1980: 16). By the beginning
of the twentieth century, the modern corporate form had spread to other parts of the
transport and communications sector, including steamship lines, urban traction
systems and the telegraph and telephone systems (Chandler, 1977: 189-203).
These changes in transport and communications were accompanied by the
emergence of modern business enterprise in distribution, although it did not diffuse as
widely in distribution as in transport and communications. For one thing, there were
limits to the degree of centralisation and standardisation that consumers found
acceptable in retailing, particularly given the relatively low levels of population
density in the United States (Hall et al., 1961: 131-138; Field, 1996: 27). And second,
as Field (1996: 25-27) notes, there were restraints on competition which acted to
support small retail outlets. In particular, resale price maintenance retained an
ambiguous legal status until 1975 and limited price competition, making it easier for
small independent retailers to survive (McCraw, 1996). In addition, state legislation
aimed at supporting the independent retailers applied escalating tax rates to businesses
with two or more retail outlets (Tedlow, 1996: 182-258; Perkins, 1999: 119-120).
The modern business enterprise was relatively slow to develop in American
finance, partly because of the nature of the business, but also partly because of the
regulatory environment. Dealing first with the nature of the business, there are
obvious dangers in adopting a high-volume, impersonal, standardised approach to
banking and finance, since asymmetric information and trust are very important in
this sector. Although simple routines have been developed for assessing risks on
7relatively small transactions, reputation and personal contact have often remained
important on large transactions. Hence we should not be surprised to see that low-
volume, high-margin business has continued to be important in financial services,
particularly in international finance, where networks of personal contacts can be more
important than modern business enterprise in generating high value added (Jones,
1993). Nevertheless, it seems clear that the emergence of modern business enterprise
in banking and finance in the United States has also been limited by regulation. In
particular, regulations prevented the growth of inter-state banking, keeping
concentration in US banking relatively low (White, 2000: 749). Calomiris (1995) also
cites the Glass-Steagall Act and Regulation Q as helping to keep American banks
small by keeping apart commercial and investment banking and by setting a ceiling
on interest rates that could be paid on bank deposits.
The appearance of modern business enterprise in services is associated with
the transformation from the counting house to the modern office (Anderson, 1976: 4;
Lockwood, 1958: 23-24). This transformation was permitted by developments in
information and communications technologies, which allowed a high-volume
approach to business (Yates, 1989; Campbell-Kelly, 1992). The key developments
included the telegraph and the telephone, which are well known, but also new
technologies of written communication and data processing, which have received less
attention.
The telegraph and telephone opened up new possibilities for rapid exchanges
of information across large distances, and hence had their biggest impact on
businesses spread over large geographical distances, such as shipping companies,
8railways, merchant wholesalers and international banks. In terms of office
management and the switch to productivity-enhancing high-volume business,
however, the impact was rather limited, since the telegraph was most often used for
ad hoc communications and the telephone for informal communications (Yates, 1989:
21-22). The introduction of the new technologies of written communication and data
processing had a more pervasive effect on business organisation. The typewriter, the
duplicating machine and the vertical filing system, radically changed the way that a
business could produce, reproduce and store documents, while calculating machines
transformed the way that firms could process data (Yates, 1989: 21-64; Cortada,
1993).
In the counting house, written records were slowly entered into large ledger
books using quill pen and ink. Copies had to be hand-written or made at the time of
writing using a rudimentary letter press, and storage of records was necessarily
chronological. The typewriter speeded up the production of documents, and together
with shorthand and dictation, freed up time for managers to concentrate on executive
decisions. The development of carbon paper and the duplicating machine made
possible multiple copies at the time of writing, while the later introduction of
photocopying separated reproduction from the production of written records. The
replacement of the ledger book by the vertical filing system meant that records no
longer had to be stored chronologically, and allowed incoming correspondence,
outgoing correspondence and internal memoranda to be combined in a system
indexed in a way that suited the record keeper. The 1880s and 1890s saw a wave of
invention of other new office machinery in the United States, including primitive
calculating machines, which transformed data processing (Cortada, 1993).
9These technological developments played an important role in the emergence
of the modern business enterprise, facilitating the standardisation of tasks within large
organisations and permitting easier monitoring of employees. The modern office thus
became a more intensive working environment than the counting house, with reduced
autonomy for workers. These aspects of the transformation of office work are
documented by Lockwood (1958: 41-96), who notes that: (1) the modern office
typically employed more clerks than the counting house (2) there was a much higher
degree of specialisation of tasks with reduced autonomy for individual clerks (3)
recruitment became more impersonal, less dependent on the personal networks of the
counting house era (4) hence there were reduced prospects of promotion to
partnership within the firm as a narrower range of tasks was undertaken (5) the
material status advantages that clerks enjoyed over the mass of manual workers were
eroded in the modern office.
It should be noted, however, that the intensification occurred for managers as
well as for workers, since the former had to monitor the latter closely. We may
therefore expect resistance to the adoption of modern office technology where
workers have power in the labour market, particularly where trade union density is
high. However, we may also expect managers and workers to perceive a common
interest in slowing the adoption of modern office technology where product market
power is strong and there are rents to be shared. This bargaining approach has been
applied by Broadberry and Crafts (1992) to Anglo-American productivity differences
in manufacturing during the interwar period, and it is natural to extend the approach
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to market services, where regulation meant that restrictions on competition were much
more systematic and persistent than in manufacturing.
III. A MODEL OF TECHNOLOGY, ORGANISATION AND PRODUCTIVITY
PERFORMANCE
1. The model
We now present a model of technology, organisation and economic performance,
which provides a framework of analysis for changing productivity leadership that is
centred on services. A more formal model is presented in the appendix, but here we
rely on a diagrammatic exposition.
An example, based on British shipping in the late nineteenth century will help
to clarify the situation being considered. As Boyce (1995) notes, shipping ventures at
the time were usually conducted by networks. A group of agents would each make an
initial investment, which would allow the purchase of a ship and other necessary
items. The aim of the venture might be to take a cargo between two cities (say
London and Buenos Aires), find a cargo for the return voyage and then sell the ship or
undertake another venture. Agents may bring different skills and commercial contacts
as well as initial capital. However, it may be extremely difficult to centralise decision
making, since it is not really possible to monitor the actions that agents need to take
and to verify that they have been carried out. This leaves scope for opportunistic
behaviour by individuals. Suppose, for example, that there are difficulties in finding a
return cargo in Buenos Aires, which reduces the profitability of the venture. This may
not be the fault of the agent on the ground in Buenos Aires, but it is very difficult and
costly for the other agents to verify this. Group reputation and the associated
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persistence of group membership, however, can be used to provide a solution to the
incentive problem and deter opportunistic behaviour.
Now consider the case where there has been an increase in the scale of
business between London and Buenos Aires and an improvement in communications,
so that agents in London can keep in continuous contact with agents in Buenos Aires
by telephone. It may now be feasible to establish a regular scheduled service between
the two ports, requiring an investment in a fleet of ships, the establishment of a
bureaucracy to run the regular service and a marketing organisation to secure
sufficient demand to fill the capacity. The establishment of a shipping line can
therefore be seen as requiring Chandler’s (1977) three-pronged investment in
production, management and marketing. The key development from our point of
view, however, is the standardisation of the business and the possibility of moving to
a hierarchical form of organisation. The entrepreneur can now specify more closely
the actions to be taken by agents and verify that they have been carried out. Wage
contracts can now be used to ensure that appropriate actions are taken by venture
members.
Time periods are indexed by t=0,1,2… and there is a collection of individuals
indexed by i, each of whom is endowed in each period with a consumption good, x,
and a set of actions a. Within each period t, utility depends positively on the
consumption good and negatively on the cost of matching actions to shocks. Each
individual agent i has a discount factor δ, where 10 << δ . We use this discount
factor to aggregate the utility an agent receives within each period to obtain a lifetime
utility for the agent. The discount factor can be thought of as reflecting the impatience
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of an individual agent. When δ is low, an individual is impatient and puts a higher
utility weight on current consumption relative to future consumption. When δ is close
to one, an individual is patient and discounts future consumption less.
There is an entrepreneur, agent 0, who is endowed with information about a
venture. The venture can be either customised or standardised, and we shall refer to
this as the venture technology. In the customised venture, individual agents must
make decisions in the light of individual information. There is a minimum venture
size K+1, with agent 0 and K other agents. All agents, including agent 0, must invest
their good and choose actions a to match participant-specific shocks θ. There is a
highest level of venture output Kcq if there is a match between action and shock for all
agents. Output will be lower than this if even one agent does not match action and
shock. In this formulation of the customised venture, the information relevant to
discerning the appropriateness of individual actions is privately observed and efficient
operation of the venture requires participants to choose different actions in response to
their privately observed shocks. Participants are thus autonomous and have
considerable discretion in choosing their actions.
The standardised venture is similar to the customised venture, but with one
key difference. Now, each participant has to choose an action to match the
corresponding common venture-wide shock. In this formulation of the standardised
venture, the information relevant to determining the appropriateness of individual
actions is commonly available and efficient operation of the venture requires
participants to choose the same action. Participants are no longer autonomous and
their scope for discretion is extremely limited.
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The two types of venture technology (customised or standardised) can be
operated by either of two organisational forms, a hierarchy or a network. A network
involves decentralised decision making: All venture members choose actions
independently, and the share of venture output of each current venture member is
fixed at 


+1
1
K
. A hierarchy involves centralised decision making: agent 0 invests
in a monitoring technology, that allows him to verify at a fixed cost M the actions of
all other agents. Agent 0 also chooses the action profile of all participants, specifies
payment as a function of those actions and verifies that they have been carried out.
Within each period, there are two stages. In the first stage, common to both
organisational forms, agent 0 chooses the venture technology and the set of current
venture members, while new and existing members decide whether or not to
participate in the venture. In the second stage, the interaction between venture
members depends on the organisational set-up and the type of venture. In a network,
individual venture members choose their actions in the light of their individual
shocks. In a hierarchy, agent 0 invests in the monitoring technology, and specifies
the actions of venture members and their payments, subject to feasibility and
participation constraints.
At each period t, a venture has a history, which can be described in terms of
past membership and past venture output. At each t, a strategy for an individual
venture member specifies all current choices as a function of history and currently
available information. We study dynamic equilibria in strategies, with the requirement
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that all members of a venture behave and are treated in the same way, both within and
across periods.
2. Results
In this section, we state some results which characterise the dynamic equilibria, using
a simple diagrammatic exposition.
RESULT 1: A network may operate a customised venture efficiently through a group
reputation mechanism, while a hierarchy may not.
With a customised venture, there are individual shocks, which cannot be observed by
the entrepreneur. In a network, the share of output for each agent is fixed in
proportion to his initial investment. However, each agent participating in today’s
venture gets a future reward from continuing to be selected for membership of the
network in the future (this future reward is discounted by δ). In a network, individuals
are induced to match actions to shocks through a group reputation mechanism,
together with the associated persistence of membership, since although individual
effort cannot be monitored, group output can. An individual who is tempted to behave
opportunistically must weigh up the short run gains against the loss of future utility
from network participation when his membership is terminated.
The essence of the result can be shown diagrammatically in Figure 1, where
we study the trade-off faced by a single current venture member, given that all other
current and future venture members choose appropriate actions. The benefit of
deviating from the appropriate action NcB is a one-shot gain, and hence does not vary
with the discount rate δ. On the other hand, if the current venture member deviates,
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venture output is reduced. Therefore, agent 0 will detect that some current member
has chosen an inappropriate action. This allows agent 0 to condition future
membership in the venture as a function of other agents’ actions. Therefore, the cost
of deviating from the appropriate action NcC  arises from the loss of the discounted
future utility as a result of membership termination. Under our assumptions, this is a
linear function of the discount rate δ. If the discount rate δ is too low (i.e. if
individuals are too impatient), then the benefit of deviating exceeds the cost, and it is
not possible to sustain a high output equilibrium. Above the critical value Ncδ ,
however, it is possible for networks to run the customised venture efficiently.
In a hierarchy, it is not possible to sustain the efficient outcome with high
output in a customised venture, because the shocks are privately observed and agent 0
does not have sufficient information to specify from the centre the correct actions to
be taken by individual venture members.
RESULT 2: A hierarchy may operate a large-scale standardised venture efficiently,
but a small-scale standardised venture may be operated efficiently only by a network.
Under the standardised venture technology, investment in the monitoring technology
allows agent 0 to verify whether the action chosen by an individual venture member
matches the common shock and to operate the venture as a hierarchy. The problem for
agent 0 is thus to condition payments to individuals on actions so that all agents
choose the appropriate action. Figure 2 illustrates this problem for an individual
venture member. Agent 0 pays each current venture member a wage (w) to
compensate the utility cost of choosing the appropriate action, so that the venture
member is indifferent between participating and not participating in the venture. In
16
Figure 2, agent 0 picks the wage w* that equate the utility from the outside option (uR)
to the net utility cost of choosing the appropriate action nu(w), which depends on the
wage. If the per capita venture output net of monitoring costs 



+
−
1K
Mq KS  is lower
than w*, the hierarchy is not feasible. On the other hand, when the per capita venture
output net of monitoring costs 



+
−
1'
'
K
Mq KS  for a larger venture of size K’, is higher
than w*, then the hierarchy is feasible. Hence a large enough standardised venture can
be run efficiently by a hierarchy.
For a smaller standardised venture, a network can use a reputation mechanism
to run the venture efficiently without investing in the monitoring technology. The
group reputation mechanism is used as in Figure 1.
Results 1 and 2 characterise how customised and standardised ventures may
be operated efficiently by networks and hierarchies. These results suggest that in
general, we would expect to see customised ventures run by networks and
standardised ventures run by hierarchies. Next, we take changes in venture technology
as exogenously determined and examine the organisational response. We show that
technological change that favours large-scale standardised ventures may create some
difficulties of adjustment for an economy with a history of networks operating small-
scale customised ventures.
RESULT 3: As venture scale increases, a hierarchy is more likely to operate a
standardised venture efficiently, while a network is less likely to operate a customised
(or standardised) venture efficiently.
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A hierarchy is more likely to be feasible when the scale of the venture is large. This is
illustrated in Figure 3(a), where a point represents a particular combination of
monitoring cost and scale, so that each venture technology corresponds to a point. For
a hierarchy to be feasible, the venture technology mist lie to the south east of the
feasibility constraint, which is upward sloping since higher fixed costs of monitoring
must be spread over a larger scale of venture output. At the venture technology given
by point A, the entrepreneur will use the network form of organisation. A change in
venture technology with larger scale, such as point B, makes it feasible for the
entrepreneur to use the hierarchical form of organisation to run the venture. A fall in
monitoring costs holding scale constant will also make a hierarchy more feasible.
We can illustrate the difficulties faced by a network operating a customised
technology as scale increases using Figure 3(b). Note that NKB  and 
N
KC  are the
benefits and costs of deviating from the appropriate action in a venture of size K, as in
Figure 1, while N'KB  and 
N
'KC  are the benefits and costs of deviating from the
appropriate action in a larger scale venture of size K’. Also, note that, as in Figure 1,
we consider the trade-off for a current venture member, given that all other current
and future venture members will choose the appropriate action. The crucial feature
that illustrates the difficulty a network faces in adapting to the increase in scale is the
fact that the minimum value of δ for which the network operates the larger scale
venture efficiently, N'Kδ , is higher than NKδ , the minimum value of δ for which the
network operates the smaller scale venture efficiently. The logic behind this result can
be understood as follows. First, as scale increases, individual deviation has a smaller
proportional negative effect on venture output, which means that N'KB  lies above 
N
KB .
Second, however, and offsetting this, the costs of deviating are also higher in the large
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scale case because the future payoff from continued membership is higher with the
higher productivity associated with the increase in scale. Hence N'KC  also lies above
N
KC . So long as the productivity increase is moderate, the first effect must dominate,
and N'Kδ  must lie to the right of NKδ . This is a reasonable assumption to make when
considering a moderate relative productivity decline such as Britain compared with
the United States.
Result 3 suggests that networks may have to transform themselves into
hierarchies to operate the standardised technology efficiently. So far, we have
assumed that the utility cost of matching an action to a shock in a hierarchy is the
same as in a network. However, there are at least two reasons for thinking that this
will not be the case. First, there is a loss of autonomy as after the transition to a
hierarchy, network members submit themselves to centralised decision making. We
assume that this loss of autonomy is reflected in an additional utility cost G of
matching an action to a shock. The second reason for higher utility costs in the
standardised venture would be if some additional education or training is required.
Similarly for the entrepreneur, G can be thought of as measuring the utility cost of the
extra burden of responsibility in the transition to a hierarchy from a network.
RESULT 4: A network operating a small-scale customised venture may fail to adapt
successfully to an exogenous change in technology that favours large-scale
standardised ventures, because network members resist the transition to hierarchy.
This is illustrated in Figure 4, which builds on Figure 2. Notice that with the old
technology, a hierarchy is not feasible, since the wage required to compensate venture
members for their efforts (w*) is more than per capita output net of monitoring costs
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



+
−
1K
Mq KS . Ignoring the extra utility costs associated with the loss of autonomy or
retraining (i.e. setting G=0), a hierarchy is feasible with the new technology, since the
required wage is below the higher per capita output net of monitoring costs




+
−
1'
'
K
Mq KS . However, if G is positive, then this additional utility cost must be added
to the reservation utility ( )Ru , which pushes up the wage payment needed to
compensate existing network members. If G is sufficiently large, then the new wage
needed to compensate existing network members '*)(w  may be greater than the per
capita output net of monitoring costs 



+
−
1'
'
K
Mq KS . Therefore, the post-transition
hierarchy is no longer feasible. Hence existing network members will face an
incentive to resist transition if they care sufficiently about the loss of autonomy
associated with the adoption of a hierarchical form of organisation or if they face
sufficiently large education or training costs. A society with a low level of general
education may therefore be expected to face a higher adjustment cost G. Note also
that a low level of education may lead to a low reservation level of utility (uR),
making it easier to sustain a network, which requires the payment received by venture
members to be above uR.
IV. LESSONS FROM HISTORY
1. The importance of services
Our first lesson, that we need to understand developments in services if we are to
understand the changing pattern of comparative productivity performance in the
economy as a whole, follows directly from the evidence presented in section II.
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Further discussion of this issue, including more quantitative evidence, is presented in
Broadberry (1998) and Broadberry and Ghosal (2002).
2. Co-existence of different technologies and organisational forms
We have noted that US overtaking occurred during the transition to high-volume
business in market services. This inevitably suggests a critical assessment of the
performance of the British market service sector, and we shall consider later the
possible factors slowing down the British transition to the new technologies and
organisational forms. First, however, it is important to emphasise the moderate nature
of the British relative economic decline, which illustrates the possibility of efficient
co-existence of different technologies and organisational forms. This is a point which
has been recognised in the literature on manufacturing, with the co-existence of mass
production and flexible production methods widely seen as efficient (Sabel and
Zeitlin, 1997; Broadberry, 1997a). However, there has been little recognition of the
significance of this point for services.
Table 4 presents data on levels of per capita income for the United Kingdom
and a selection of other countries, expressed in dollars of 1990 purchasing power. The
countries compared with Britain are similar to those examined by McCloskey (1990:
47). It is clear that despite relative decline, Britain has remained a part of the rich
world, represented here by the United States and France. The British economy has
continued to deliver living standards massively above those experienced in poor
countries such as India and China, while Britain has managed to avoid relative decline
on the scale of Argentina.
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Britain avoided becoming part of the Third World by continuing to succeed in
parts of the economy that remained suited to network forms of organisation. We have
already noted how the later and more limited spread of high-volume, low-margin
business into distribution and finance is associated with the later emergence and
smaller scale of productivity gaps in these sectors, compared with transport and
communications. However, the continued success of British networks in market
services also shows up in a more nuanced way in the contribution of these sectors to
the current account of the balance of payments. For, as Imlah (1958: 55) notes,
shipping remained the largest contributor to the substantial surplus on business
services before 1914, with distribution and finance combined generating a smaller
surplus. By the interwar period, however, Sayers (1976: Appendix 32, Table A)
suggests a larger positive contribution from financial services than from shipping.
Although the distinction between sectors where high-volume business became
important and sectors which remained dominated by low-volume business appears to
show up in the productivity data, then, the balance of payments data are more
consistent with the co-existence of the two forms of business within each sector. This
reflects the pattern identified in the manufacturing literature, that even where high-
volume business became important, there was still space for flexible, low-volume
producers in market niches. Despite the growth of competition from foreign shipping
lines before World War I, British networks retained a strong position in tramp
shipping until the interwar period (Boyce, 1995). In distribution, despite the steady
rise of large-scale multiple retailers, British wholesale trading networks displayed a
remarkable resilience throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Jones, 2000).
A similarly strong performance was recorded by British overseas banks, based on the
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network form of organisation, despite the growing dominance of large-scale
hierarchical banks in the domestic retail banking market (Jones, 1993). The continued
role of London as a major centre of international finance has also been based on the
network form of organisation (Cassis, 1994; Kynaston, 2001).
3. Difficulties of adjustment
The second lesson, that technologies and organisational forms can co-exist, helps us
to understand why British relative decline was quite modest. However, there is a
danger of taking the rehabilitation of Britain’s twentieth century economic
performance too far (Rubinstein, 1993; Booth, 2001). It is therefore important to
balance the second lesson with our third lesson, that technological change can cause
difficulties of adjustment in technology-using sectors if it is not suited to the social
capabilities of the society. This reminds us that the move to high-volume business
originated in the United States, and created difficulties of adjustment in Britain. Those
difficulties of adjustment account for the moderate British relative decline which did
occur.
A society’s ability to absorb new technology is limited by its social capability,
a concept first introduced by Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973) and developed by
Abramovitz (1986). The key quantifiable factor affecting social capability is the level
of education, and Table 5 provides data on formal schooling in Britain and the United
States. Although there are obvious difficulties in comparing enrolment data across
countries, these issues have been worked over by a number of scholars, and it is now
possible to draw fairly firm conclusions in several areas (Mitch, 1992; Goldin, 1998;
Lindert, 2001). First, it is clear that Britain lagged behind the United States in the
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provision of mass primary education until about 1900, as has been widely noted in the
history of education literature. Second, Britain lagged behind the United States in the
development of mass secondary education between the two World Wars. This has
been noted by historians of education such as Ringer (1979: 252-253), and has also
been emphasised recently in the work of Goldin (1998). Third, Britain lagged behind
the United States in the provision of mass higher education after World War II. By
1990, tertiary enrolment ratios in Britain were still a long way behind US levels.
Three points should be borne in mind when interpreting these trends. First, the
transfer from primary to secondary education has generally occurred at a later age in
the United States than in Britain, affecting the breakdown between primary and
secondary education. Second, however, it is not possible to give enrolment ratios for
narrower age bands, as the difference between primary and secondary education was a
matter of class as well as age before World War II. Third, some of the educational
deficiency in Britain may have been made up by part-time commercial education,
particularly with the growth of shorthand courses at the end of the nineteenth century
(Anderson, 1976: 101-104; Guerriero Wilson, 1998: 60-62). However, the limited
evidence of enrolments on such courses in Glasgow and Lancashire and Cheshire
suggests that this could not have overturned the substantial US educational advantage
(Guerriero Wilson, 1998: 134; Anderson, 1976: 92, 97). The higher enrolment rates in
the United States clearly reflect a greater investment in human capital per person than
in Britain.
Previous researchers have tended to play down the role of education in
differential productivity performance between Britain and the United States. This is
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partly as a result of the focus on industry, where the link between formal schooling
and the tasks performed by most workers is rather tenuous. In services, by contrast,
the link between the tasks performed by most office workers and education
(particularly the three R’s and languages) is rather closer. However, it also partly
reflects the fact that estimates of comparative education levels by Maddison (1991)
put the United States behind Britain in terms of years of education thorughout the
twentieth century, a finding that would be difficult to square with the enrolments data,
and which has been rejected decisively by Goldin (1998; 2001).
A second aspect of social capability is the willingness of the labour force to
accept the intensification of work and the intrusiveness of monitoring associated with
the transition to high-throughput methods. As with mass production technology in
manufacturing, modern office technology in services reduced the autonomy of
workers, creating an army of workers performing standardised tasks and subject to
close monitoring (Braverman, 1974: 321). It is worth noting that the pattern of British
trade union densities in Table 6 shows high union densities in the large-scale
hierarchically organised transport and communications sector, and lower union
densities in the distribution and financial services sectors. It seems likely that the
degree of employment concentration acts as a proxy for the amount of autonomy
experienced by individual workers, with the working conditions of workers becoming
increasingly standardised in larger organisations (Lockwood, 1958: 141; Anderson,
1976: 110).
In fact, however, as in manufacturing, there is evidence that managers disliked
the intensive monitoring as much as the workers who were being monitored. Thus,
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Campbell-Kelly (1998: 24) finds managers in the Post Office Savings Bank as
strongly opposed as the workers to the introduction of modern office technology. The
decision to retain bound ledgers, for example, was supported by management with the
argument that a card-based system would be “most troublesome and distasteful to the
clerks” and would “render their daily duties more irksome and difficult”. As
Campbell-Kelly (1998: 24) notes, the concern of the managers with the welfare of the
workers rings rather hollow given their previous record, but there can be no doubt
about their distaste for modern office technology. It is not simply that unionised
workers resisted the attempts of managers to introduce new technology. Rather,
workers and managers shared rents arising from a sheltered competitive environment.
We now show how these differences in social capabilities led to a slower rate
of adoption of productivity-enhancing office technology in Britain. We begin with the
diffusion of the telephone, as measured by the number of connections and extensions
per 100 population, shown here in Table 7. It is only possible to distinguish between
business and residential telephones from the 1920s, but it is clear that before 1920 the
scale of telephone ownership was so much higher in the United States than in Britain
that it must have affected business usage (Hannah, 1974: 257). After 1920, although
the absolute scale of the gap between the two countries continued to increase, the
proportional gap narrowed. Furthermore, the gap was considerably smaller for
business telephones than for total telephones. Nevertheless, it is clear that the United
States retained an advantage even in business telephones, which must have affected
business-to-business communications. This U.S. advantage must also have been
reinforced in business-to-consumer communications, which require high overall
levels of telephone ownership. One problem here, however, is that the slow
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development of telephone usage in Britain may reflect simply the supply policies of
the Post Office, which had a monopoly of the telephone service for much of the
period under consideration (Foreman-Peck and Millward, 1994: 252).
However, we can show that Britain was also slow to adopt data processing
machinery and other office machinery such as the typewriter. In Table 8, we present
some flow data on sales of office machinery in Britain and the United States from the
early 1900s to the late 1960s. The starting date reflects the fact that office machinery
was not recorded separately in British trade statistics before 1908, while the end date
reflects the growing importance of the electronic computer. Sales have been
calculated by subtracting exports from the sum of production and retained imports. In
the case of typewriters, the volume of units is available, and this has been used in the
comparison of sales between the countries. In the case of cash registers, calculating
machines and other office machinery, the lack of adequate volume data means that the
value of sales must be used in the comparison between countries. Sales values are
converted to a common currency using a unit value price ratio, reflecting deviations
from purchasing power parity. Finally, current prices in sterling are converted to
constant 1929 prices using the UK deflator for GDP at constant factor cost.
For typewriters, the US/UK comparative sales per 1000 population ratio
fluctuates around a level of about 3-to-1, giving the US a considerable lead. For cash
registers, calculating machines and other office machinery, the ratio fluctuates rather
more, but around a higher level of the order of 5-to-1. The flow data on office
machine sales, then, point clearly in the same direction as the stock data on telephone
ownership, with a large US advantage.
27
Although nobody has previously assembled data on the diffusion of modern
office equipment, there have been a number of case studies of office mechanisation in
Britain, which it is helpful to reconsider in the light of our findings on comparative
productivity performance. Campbell-Kelly (1998) demonstrates the existence of
conservative attitudes towards new technology in the Post Office Savings Bank
(POSB) before World War I. Thus the POSB resisted the introduction of the
typewriter before 1914 on the grounds that given the scale of operations, pre-printed
standard responses were cheaper, with more than 550 standard replies in use by 1885,
rising to one thousand by 1914 (Campbell-Kelly, 1998: 22). Similarly, calculating
machines were of little value to the POSB because the bank had developed an
accounting system that required balances to be calculated only at the end of the year
when interest calculations were made. Furthermore, interest computations could
easily be made manually since the interest rate of 2.5 per cent corresponded to an
exact halfpenny per pound per month and interest was paid only on whole pounds for
whole months. The objection to loose-leaf filing depended on a perceived threat to
security, since it was almost impossible to lose an account or to create a phantom
account by inserting a fresh page in a bound ledger book. In this latter case, the nature
of the business set limits to the diffusion of modern office technology. In all three
cases, however, note that conservative attitudes to new technology were consistent
with economic efficiency. It is therefore important to note that in financial services,
there was no substantial Anglo-American productivity difference before World War I.
In transport and communications, however, and particularly on the railways, a
large Anglo-American productivity gap had opened up by the interwar period.
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Campbell-Kelly’s (1994) study of the Railway Clearing House is thus able to uncover
examples of persistent inefficiency that remained sheltered from competitive
pressures. Thus, for example, the Office Appliances Committee established by the
Railway Clearing House in 1920 recommended mechanising the calculation of local
ton-mile statistics by buying six Comptometers at £100 16s 0d each (Campbell-Kelly,
1994: 70) Since this allowed the replacement of 70 male clerks by six female clerks, it
yielded an annual saving of over £18,000 for a one-time outlay of a little over £600!
Campbell-Kelly notes that there were many similar examples, none of which elicited
any critical comment from the Office Compliances Committee. It is important that the
Railway Clearing House was effectively a monopoly, free from the competitive
pressures that would have forced the adoption of the efficient technology.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We began by considering a specific historical episode, the changing comparative
productivity performance of Britain and the United States since 1870. We noted that
(1) the United States overtook Britain in comparative productivity levels for the whole
economy primarily as a result of trends in services rather than trends in industry (2)
US overtaking of Britain in market services occurred during the transition to
standardised, high-volume, low-margin business with hierarchical management from
the 1870s (3) this development was dependent on technologies that improved
communications and information processing
We then presented a model of technology, organisation and economic
performance, which provides a framework for the analysis of changing productivity
leadership that is centred on services. We showed that: (1) a network with
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decentralised decision-making is a more suitable organisational form than a hierarchy
with centralised decision making and monitoring for carrying out customised ventures
where venture members must make decisions in the light of individual information (2)
a hierarchy is a more suitable organisational form than a network for carrying out
standardised ventures where the decisions of venture members depend on common
venture-wide information rather than individual information (3) a rise in venture scale
or decrease in monitoring cost increases the feasibility of hierarchies and decreases
the feasibility of networks (4) technological change that favours large scale
standardised ventures may create difficulties of adjustment for a society with a history
of success based upon (and hence social capabilities suited to) networks.
Finally, we drew out three general lessons that follow from this historical and
theoretical analysis. First, an understanding of the major changes in comparative
productivity performance among modern economies requires an understanding of
developments in services. The study of economic growth has been focused for too
long on industry. This point has been made recently by Bernard and Jones (1996) for
the period since 1970, but it applies equally to the previous century. Second, different
technologies and organisational forms can co-exist efficiently. This has been
recognised in the literature on manufacturing with the co-existence of mass
production and flexible production, but it applies equally to market services (Sabel
and Zeitlin, 1997). Third, technological change can cause difficulties of adjustment in
technology-using sectors if it is not suited to the social capabilities of that society.
This point again comes out more clearly in the analysis of technology-using service
sectors rather than technology-producing industrial sectors.
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TABLE 1: Comparative U.S./U.K. labor productivity levels by sector, 1869/71 to
1990 (U.K.=100)
Agriculture Industry Services Aggregate
economy
1869/71 86.9 153.6 85.8 89.8
1889/91 102.1 164.5 84.2 94.1
1909/11 103.2 193.5 107.3 117.7
1919/20 128.0 198.2 119.0 133.3
1929 109.7 222.9 121.2 139.4
1937 103.3 190.6 120.0 132.6
1950 126.0 243.9 140.8 166.9
1973 131.2 215.1 137.3 152.3
1990 151.1 163.0 129.6 133.0
Notes: Benchmark estimates of comparative productivity levels for 1937 are projected
to other years using time series for output and employment from historical national
accounting sources.
Sources: Derived from Broadberry (1997b).
TABLE 2: Comparative U.S./U.K. labor productivity levels in market services,
1869/71 to 1990 (U.K.=100)
Transport &
communications
Distribution Finance,
professional
& personal
services
1869/71 110.0 66.9 64.1
1889/91 167.1 97.0 53.2
1909/11 217.4 120.0 77.9
1919/20 250.6 109.0 103.6
1929 231.5 121.9 101.5
1937 283.4 119.8 96.1
1950 348.4 135.2 111.5
1973 303.3 149.6 118.0
1979 302.7 153.8 118.3
1990 270.5 166.0 101.0
Notes: Benchmark estimates of comparative productivity levels for 1937 are projected
to other years using time series for output and employment from historical national
accounting sources.
Sources: Broadberry (1997b).
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TABLE 3: Benchmark estimates of U.S./U.K. comparative labor productivity
levels in market services, 1870-1993 (U.K.=100)
1870 1890 1910 1924 1930 1937
Railways 76.2 158.2 215.5 342.2 447.9 390.6
Communications 143.5 136.1 166.5 270.0
Distribution 118.7 119.8
Finance 43.3 68.9 119.9 155.8 103.0 86.4
1950 1968 1993
Railways 620.7 395.0 370.3
Road transport 167.2
Shipping 170.0
Air transport 152.0
Communications 144.6 302.0 152.9
Distribution 148.4 143.6
Finance 138.7 117.7
Notes: Benchmark estimates based on direct observation for the years stated.
Sources: Broadberry (1997b). Railway estimates for 1870 and 1890 derived from
Fishlow (1966), Mitchell (1988), Cain (1980) and Hawke (1970). Additional figures
for 1968 from Pryke (1971), for 1973 from Smith et al. (1982), for 1993 from
O’Mahony et al. (1998).
TABLE 4: GDP per capita, 1870-1992 (dollars of 1990 purchasing power)
UK USA France India China Argentina
1870 3,263 2,457 1,858 558 523 1,311
1900 4,593 4,096 2,849 625 652 2,756
1913 5,032 5,307 3,452 663 688 3,797
1950 6,847 9,573 5,221 597 614 4,987
1973 11,992 16,607 12,940 853 1,186 7,970
1992 15,738 21,558 17,959 1,348 3,098 7,616
Source: Derived from Maddison (1995: 23-24).
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TABLE 5: Educational enrolment rates per 1000 population under age 20, 1870-
1990
A. Britain
Primary Secondary Higher
1871 118.6
1881 238.4
1891 285.8
1901 344.7 1.6
1911 374.1 11.1
1921 371.8 24.1 3.8
1931 380.6 31.7
1938 357.1 37.1 4.8
1951 323.1 164.4 8.7
1961 299.8 233.2 13.9
1971 337.4 258.0 26.0
1981 327.4 327.4 30.5
1991 333.1 279.1 46.8
B. United States
Primary Secondary Higher
1870 390.6 4.2
1880 404.5 4.6
1890 492.5 10.3
1900 478.9 18.7
1910 475.6 26.8
1920 472.9 56.1 15.8
1930 479.2 99.6 23.1
1938 472.2 147.1 29.8
1950 409.6 125.2 52.0
1960 436.6 138.6 62.5
1970 443.0 187.4 111.5
1980 389.0 248.7 167.0
1990 434.1 213.3 191.1
Sources: Britain: Primary and secondary school enrolments: Mitchell (1988: 799-
810); Education Statistics for the United Kingdom; Higher enrolments: Halsey (1988:
270-272); Education Statistics for the United Kingdom; Population: Mitchell (1988:
15); Annual Abstract of Statistics.
United States: Primary and secondary school enrolments: Historical Statistics of the
United States (1975: 368-369); Statistical Abstract of the United States; Higher
enrolments: Tyack (1967: 478); Population: Historical Statistics of the United States:
From Colonial Times to 1970 (1975: 15); Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Notes: For Britain, primary and secondary enrolment data refer to England and Wales
only.
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TABLE 6: Union density in services, Great Britain, 1892-1971 (%)
1901 1911 1921 1931 1951 1961 1971
Railways 11.3 16.9 59.1 55.3 84.8 85.1 91.2
Road transport 14.6 33.3 59.2 48.8 93.0 91.8 85.4
Sea transport 10.6 83.3 73.4 55.7 80.4 84.0 89.8
Inland waterways 38.2 86.0 80.2 67.4 90.2 77.3 82.6
Air transport 56.1 49.3 68.9
Post &
telecommunications
42.7 59.2 64.2 62.4 81.2 85.3 84.9
Distribution 2.7 5.4 9.0 7.2 15.0 12.3 11.6
Insurance, banking &
finance
2.4 6.7 22.4 17.5 29.5 31.3 34.7
Source: Bain and Price (1981).
TABLE 7: Telephones per 100 population, 1900-1980
Total telephones Business telephones
U.K. U.S. U.K. U.S.
1900 0.005 1.8
1905 0.08 4.9
1910 0.2 8.3
1915 1.7 10.5
1920 2.0 12.5 4.0
1925 2.9 14.6 2.1 4.8
1930 4.1 16.3 2.9 5.6
1935 5.1 13.7 3.4 5.0
1940 6.9 16.6 4.1 6.4
1950 10.2 28.4 6.2 8.5
1960 15.0 41.3 8.4 11.6
1970 25.1 59.0 12.3 16.2
1980 47.5 79.6 17.4 21.1
Sources: U.K.: Total and business telephones: Mitchell (1988: 566-567);
Telecommunications Statistics; Population: Mitchell (1988: 13-14). U.S.: Total and
business telephones: Historical Statistics of the United States; Statistical Abstract of
the United States; Population: Historical Statistics of the United States; Statistical
Abstract of the United States.
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TABLE 8: Office machine sales per 1000 population, 1908-1968
A. Typewriters (units)
1908 1924 1930 1935 1948 1958 1968
U.K. 0.50 1.29 1.32 1.78 1.74 3.65 5.70
U.S. 1.13 3.68 4.34 6.08 7.76 8.91 18.62
B. Cash registers, calculating machines and other office machinery (£ at constant
1929 prices)
1930 1935 1948 1958 1968
U.K. 28.3 33.3 106.0 289.5 509.2
U.S. 128.9 187.8 252.1 757.6 2,352.6
Notes: Sales obtained as production minus exports plus imports. U.S. values
converted to sterling at unit value price ratios for manufacturing; current prices in
sterling converted to constant prices using the U.K. deflator for GDP at factor cost.
Dates for U.S.: 1900, 1925, 1929, 1937, 1947, 1958, 1967; Sources: Production: U.S.:
Census of Manufactures; U.K.: Census of Production; Exports and imports: U.S.:
Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States; U.K.: Annual Statement of
the Trade of the United Kingdom; Population: U.S.: Statistical Abstract of the United
States; U.K.: Feinstein (1972); Annual Abstract of Statistics; Manufacturing unit value
price ratios: Broadberry (1997a); Deflator for GDP at factor cost, U.K.: Feinstein
(1972); Economic Trends Annual Supplement.
35
FIGURE 1: Customised venture
FIGURE 2: Standardised venture
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FIGURE 3: Interactions between scale and organisation
(a) Scale and hierarchy
(b) Scale and networks
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FIGURE 4: Adjustment costs
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